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1 INTRODUCTION1
Had anyone asked a tax specialist seven years ago, say,
whether countries could ever have agreed on anything
like the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) pack-
age, and whether some of what they had agreed would
also be implemented through a multilateral instrument
(MLI), the reactions would most certainly have been
extremely pitying. However, since the G20 leaders first
called on the OECD in June 20122 to work out a plan
to combat BEPS, countries within the OECD/G20 and
EU have proved able to find common ground. This
was seen when they responded to pressure from pub-
lic opinion and rising levels of sovereign debt by
starting to work on joint actions to combat tax plan-
ning by multinationals (MNOs) under the guidance of
the OECD Secretariat and the European Commission.
Another reason for their willingness to cooperate is
that they know that tax policies based on ‘every man
for himself’ are more likely to lead to lower rather
than higher tax revenues.3 And that, in turn, will put
even more pressure on high-quality and fair social,
ecological and tax policies.4
It was in 2013 that the OECD identified a total of
fifteen action items needing to be addressed in order to
combat BEPS,5 followed two years later by the
publication of a plan for each action point.
Surprisingly, however, after two years of meetings, the
OECD and G20 countries have so far only been able to
agree on minimum standards for implementation in the
case of four of these action items. The various countries
committed themselves to: (1) implementing anti-abuse
provisions (Action Point 6), (2) introducing standardized
Country-by-Country reporting (Action Items 13), (3)
revitalizing the peer review process so as to combat
harmful tax practices (this includes embracing the mod-
ified nexus approach for IP regimes and the compulsory
exchanging of information on six types of rulings)
(Action Item 5), and (4) introducing effective mutual
agreement procedures (Action Item 14). Of these four
minimum standards, the first and the last are to be
implemented via the MLI (Action Point 15), while a
common approach has been devised for (1) neutralizing
hybrid mismatches (Action Item 2) and (2) combatting
excessive interest deductions (Action Item 4). Lastly the
various countries reached agreement on best practice
guidelines for a CFC measure (Action Item 3) and com-
pulsory disclosure of aggressive tax structures (Action
Item 12).
This contribution considers the extent to which these
commitments to combatting BEPS will prove effective in
practice. We zoom in specifically on the choice by the
OECD and G20 for a monitoring and peer review model
to ensure countries comply with their BEPS commit-
ments. In an earlier contribution to EC Tax Review we
criticized the way in which the EU had responded to the
BEPS outcomes by opting for a directive as its imple-
mentation instrument of choice.6 We concluded at the
time that it would be preferable for the EU to implement
the outcomes through a peer review system, structured
along the lines of the model opted for by the Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information
for Tax Purposes (Transparency Forum) rather than
through a directive.
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Before addressing the issue at the heart of this con-
tribution, we will outline the background to the current
international tax system in section 2. In contrast to the
EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
OECD’s efforts to combat BEPS have paid barely any
attention to tackling the problems in the current inter-
national tax system at the source. We therefore first
discuss why the current tax framework facilitates BEPS
by MNOs. In section 3 we discuss the policy strategies
devised by the OECD and the EU in their efforts to
combat BEPS, while also briefly considering how the
malfunctioning of the current international tax system
could be addressed at the source. Section 4 focuses on
the respective methods chosen by the EU and the OECD
for implementing and enforcing the BEPS commitments,
while our closing comments are set out in section 5.
2 CURRENT TAX FRAMEWORK: OVERTAKEN
BY GLOBALIZATION WITH RESIDUAL PROFITS
ENDING UP IN FAVOURABLE TAX JURISDICTIONS
2.1 Introduction
The OECD responded to the G20’s call for an action plan
by firstly seeking, in the second half of 2012, to establish
the extent of the BEPS problem. As part of its research
the OECD also set out to identify the global develop-
ments influencing the organizational forms that enter-
prises are nowadays choosing to adopt. According to the
OECD, globalization and digitalization mean individual
enterprises within a group now operate under the poli-
cies and strategies of the group as a whole. This in turn
has contributed to the creation of ‘global value chains’
and, therefore, to the further growth of MNOs. And this,
in the OECD’s view, is one of the factors creating the
conditions needed for an MNO – acting as a single,
integrated enterprise – to operate a global strategy target-
ing profit maximization and cost reduction, including
the use of opportunities for tax-saving.
These developments, as the OECD explains, take no
account of national taxes and the international rules for
allocating taxation rights between countries. The OECD
discusses this issue in more detail in its ‘Addressing
BEPS’ report. Its explanation is based on three examples,
which show the tax benefits that MNOs’ cross-border
economic integration allows them to obtain by exploiting
loopholes in the ‘outdated’ international tax framework.
To make matters worse, MNOs are even being assisted in
this process by countries either consciously or uncon-
sciously using tax competition as a means of attracting
inward investments. The OECD therefore concludes
from the above that:
the international common principles (…) may not have
kept pace with the changing business environment.
Domestic rules for international taxation and internationally
agreed standards are still grounded in an economic envir-
onment characterised by a lower degree of economic
integration across borders, rather than today’s environment
of global taxpayers, characterised by the increasing impor-
tance of intellectual property as a value-driver and by con-
stant developments of information and communication
technologies.7
In other words, the OECD recognizes a more fundamen-
tal policy issue as being the underlying cause of BEPS.
In the light of this conclusion, it is in our view
remarkable that neither in its 2013 ‘Addressing BEPS’
nor in the subsequent 2013 ‘Action Plan on BEPS’
reports, the OECD raises questions about or makes any
proposals for reforming the way in which MNOs’ profits
are currently taxed.8 Even though the February 2013
identifies the foundations on which the current tax fra-
mework is based and why these are creaking at the
seams – due to the ‘separate entity approach’, and the
use of the arm’s length principle to determine the profits
of each entity within a group , the OECD nevertheless
opted to preserve these creaking foundations, by making
it more difficult for MNOs to exploit differences between
countries’ national tax systems through international tax
schemes.
Before we move on, in section 3, to discuss the
OECD’s policy strategy in seeking to combat BEPS, we
will outline, in section 2.2, the background against
which the connecting factors currently used in national
tax systems were established in the early twentieth cen-
tury. In section 2.3 we then discuss the enormous
expansion of enterprises in recent decades, how these
enterprises started structuring themselves differently,
both legally and organizationally, and how these devel-
opments have resulted in the existing connecting factors
for taxation no longer being ‘fit for purpose’. This huge
expansion of enterprises, combined with organizational
change, has been driven primarily by the rapid accelera-
tion in technological and logistic innovations in the fields
of transport and communications (‘time-space compres-
sion’) and economic liberalization from the 1970s
onwards.9 Lastly, section 2.4 examines how MNOs are
able to apply the outdated connecting factors to keep
their residual profits outside the scope of countries’
taxation systems.
2.2 Origins of the Current Connecting Factors
in Corporate Tax
The taxation of enterprises in the Western world has
developed since the early twentieth century, when coun-
tries started introducing systems to tax entities’ profits.
At that time, most enterprises operated within a single
7 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 5, 7, 27, 28 and
49 (OECD Publishing: Paris 2013).
8 The OECD states on p. 14 of its ‘Addressing BEPS’ report that There
is consensus among governments that moving to a system of formulary
apportionment of profits is not a viable way forward.
9 For more details, see de Graaf, supra n. 3, at 9–18.
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legal entity and from a single location close to their
customers. All the enterprise’s functions,10 assets and
risks were concentrated within that single entity, to
which and from which all products and services were
supplied. This can be illustrated by the example of a
potter making all his earthenware pots by hand at the
back of his workshop, firing them and then displaying
them, ready for sale, in his shop window. All the value
chain activities are then performed within a single legal
entity and at a single location.
Given the ties that most entities had at that time with
their locations, it was perfectly logical for countries to
base their taxation of enterprise profits on entities’
nationality or place of residence. An entity normally
derives its nationality from the company laws of the
country in which it is established or has its principal
place of management. The basis on which a country
determines whether it sees an entity as one of its
nationals depends on the doctrine that the country
chooses to apply: in other words, the place of incorpora-
tion (or statutory seat) doctrine, or the actual seat of
management (real seat) doctrine. If a country chooses
an entity’s place of residence as the basis for levying
corporate tax, this place will normally be determined
by the location from which the entity is effectively
managed.
Apart from a country using an entity’s nationality or
actual place of management as the basis for subjecting it
to corporate tax, a country can normally also tax a
‘foreign’ entity on profits generated on activities per-
formed in that country. Before a country can tax an
entity on these activities, however, there will need to
be a certain presence, or nexus, in that jurisdiction. If a
‘foreign’ entity has a nexus with another country, such
that it can be regarded as having a permanent establish-
ment, the entity will be taxed in that other country to the
extent that the profits obtained from the business activ-
ities are generated by means of the permanent establish-
ment in that country.
2.3 Current Connecting Factors for Corporate
Tax Have Become Outdated
As explained above, it is the entity rather than the
enterprise that is the taxable person as far as countries’
corporate tax systems are concerned. An entity is taxable
in a specific country if it has (1) the nationality of that
country, (2) its place of residence in that country, or (3)
a permanent establishment in that country. By now,
however, seeking recourse for taxation purposes to the
entity’s nationality or (actual) place of residence, or to
the presence of a permanent establishment, has long
since ceased to align with the way in which enterprises
are structured, either legally or organizationally.
Whereas the location and composition of an entity’s
management and the place from which the entity’s enter-
prise is managed were previously one and the same, the
developments outlined above mean that these places
have become increasingly divergent over the past few
decades. From a legal perspective, an MNO now com-
prises hundreds of entities established in many different
countries and managed by executives operating across
the globe. Whereas enterprise functions, assets and risks
were previously concentrated within a single entity and
at a single location close to its customers, as in the case
of the potter, MNOs have since replaced this traditional
structure by locating enterprise functions, assets and
risks within the group entity and at the location regarded
as most suitable for the purpose.
These days, the place where an MNO performs its
operating activities is determined primarily by factors
such as labour productivity, trade barriers, import
duties, transport costs and the proximity of suppliers
and customers. Since the 1980s and 1990s, however,
certain factors affecting the localization of MNOs’ oper-
ating activities have changed, particularly in Asia’s
favour, and MNOs have responded by operating on an
increasingly international scale.11 According to research
conducted by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis, the factors playing an important role in
determining where R&D activities are located include
the past, the availability of suitably qualified researchers
and the quality of the public knowledge infrastructure.12
An MNO’s strategic functions, by contrast, tend to be
centralized close to a major urban hub in a variety of
networks (financial, transport and communications) and
held through a top holding company. At the same time,
and for reasons of efficiency, MNOs have chosen to
locate their management support services (such as sales
activities, invoicing, procurement, customer support, HR
policy and group financing) in what are known as shared
service centres, ideally in countries offering a favourable
tax regime, such as Ireland and Switzerland.13
Apart from enterprises structuring themselves differ-
ently in legal and organizational terms, further empha-
sizing why the current connecting factors are not
satisfactory, technological and logistic innovations exa-
cerbated this trend further. The emergence of online
business models has enabled certain MNOs14 to sell
their goods and services in countries without an imma-
nent need for a physical establishment there. This made
it more difficult for a country (destination country)
wanting to tax the profits generated by an MNO entity
10 In other words, their operational, strategic and support activities
and their R&D.
11 See also Ángel Gurría, The Emergence of Global Value Chains: What
Do They Mean for Business. G20 Trade and Investment Promotion
Summit (Mexico City: OECD 5 Nov. 2012).
12 See M. Cornet & M. Rensman, The Location of R&D in the
Netherlands: Trends, Determinants and Policy 7 and 37–41 (The
Hague: CPB 2001).
13 de Graaf, supra n. 3, at 30–31.
14 Such as Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple.
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on sales of goods or services to demonstrate that these
profits have been generated through a permanent estab-
lishment in its jurisdiction. Under the international defi-
nition of a permanent establishment, dating back to the
early twentieth century, merely having a visible presence
in the form of a store front (either physical or digital) or
sales staff is not sufficient to constitute a taxable pre-
sence. For a permanent establishment to exist however, a
physical establishment has to be available to the enter-
prise on an ongoing basis. As a result, the profits of such
MNOs are consequently taxed only marginally, and
sometimes not at all, in the countries where they sell
their products and services.15 In itself, this is perfectly
understandable, given that the existing international tax
rules allocate profit taxation rights primarily to the coun-
tries from which the goods and services originate (i.e.
where entities deploy their capital and labour). And the
OECD, G20 and EU have so far not moved away from
this basic principle of international tax law. Indeed, the
decisions made in respect of the BEPS project have in
effect renewed support for this principle by stating that
the rights to tax enterprise profits should be assigned to
the countries where value is added.16
It is not only the vanishing need for MNOs to have a
physical presence in countries in order to be able to
supply their products and services, but also the fact
that they no longer need to operate through a local entity
in such a country that is making it increasingly difficult
for countries to tax MNO profits.
2.4 Residual Profits Outside the Scope
of Traditional Corporate Tax Connecting
Factors
Insofar as an MNO has a physical presence in a country
(i.e. a limited liability to tax) or is present through a
group entity (i.e. a full liability to tax), the question
arises as to how much of the MNO’s profit can be
attributed to that local presence (i.e. the extent of its
taxable base). An MNO can minimize its local ‘presence’
by having as few functions, assets (in particular intangi-
ble assets) and risks as possible in the relevant jurisdic-
tion. Wherever possible, an MNO will prefer to allocate
or reallocate functions, assets and risks (and the related
profit-dependent remuneration) to group entities in tax-
friendly, or more tax-friendly, jurisdictions. Countries’
tax rules normally align with these legal and, insofar as
required, actual allocations or reallocations of enterprise
functions, assets and risks.17 By allocating or reallocating
functions, assets and risks in this way, an MNO can in
effect strip out (or, in OECD/G20 terms, erode) its pre-
sence in high-tax countries, with only minimal levels of
profit still able to be attributed to the residual (eroded)
local presence.
By applying a strategy of ‘eroding and shifting’ MNOs
have been able to shift residual/combined profits from
high-tax to low tax nor no tax jurisdictions. Such strate-
gies generally prove successful because countries have
traditionally attributed the liability for corporate taxes to
entities as taxable subjects rather than to enterprises
because entities are individually liable for tax (i.e. the
‘separate entity’ approach). This approach allows entities
within an MNO to engage in intra-group transactions
that are, in principle, in accordance with the tax rules,
because they are all recognized for tax purposes. The
‘separate entity’ approach and the tax recognition of
transactions between affiliated entities makes it relatively
easy for MNOs to exploit rate (and other) differences
between national tax systems.18 By, on the one hand,
maintaining only a minimal presence in terms of func-
tions, assets and risks in high-tax countries and, on the
other hand, maximizing their presence in low-tax coun-
tries, MNOs can successfully minimize their overall tax
burden. It is these opportunities – alongside business
economic, organizational and company law-related rea-
sons – that explain why today’s MNOs consist of hun-
dreds of entities spread across the world, including in tax
havens, and that account for the multitude of transac-
tions that such entities enter into with other members of
their group.
From the 1960s onwards, tax authorities, and the US
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in particular, became
increasingly aware of these ‘erode and shift’ strategies.
In an attempt to combat such strategies, the US govern-
ment decided that intra-group transactions should sub-
sequently be governed by the arm’s length principle,
which had its origins in the 1930s. In order to put this
concept into practice, the US Treasury devised a series of
15 See Arnaud de Graaf, Paul de Haan & Maarten de Wilde,
Fundamental Change in Countries’ Corporate Tax Framework Needed
to Properly Address BEPS, (5) Intertax 310–311 (2014).
16 See e.g. OECD, supra n. 7, at 10; OECD, Executive Summary,
OECD/G20 Base Erosion Profit Shifting Project 27–32 (OECD: Paris
2015); and the first sentence in the recitals of the EU’s Anti-Tax
Avoidance Directive. This system of allocating taxation rights on
the basis of production factors largely benefits countries with a
trade surplus and is disadvantageous for countries with a trade
deficit. Countries in the latter category, such as the United States,
consequently have much to gain from an apportionment method
based on sales’ destination. See e.g. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly
A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax
Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, (5) Fla. Tax
Rev. 509–510 (2009).
17 The situation is different, however, if the structure involves a well-
capitalized group entity based in a low-tax jurisdiction and used for
receiving dividends, interest and royalties. Under CFC regulations
or the new BEPS Action Points 8–10, the profits of such an entity
can then be attributed to group entities in higher-taxed countries.
Many countries view such situations as artificial and so evidently
tax-driven that the economic rather than the legal reality is allowed
to prevail.
18 A group entity in a low-tax country can, e.g. grant a loan to a group
entity in a high-tax country. The borrower can, in principle, deduct
interest paid on the loan at the higher rate of tax, while the interest
received by the lender is taxed at a low rate or may not even be
liable for tax. Countries can also create such ‘loopholes’, either
consciously or unconsciously, to make themselves more attractive
for MNOs wishing to establish or invest.
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transfer pricing guidelines, which also formed the basis
for the OECD’s 1977 Transfer Pricing Guidelines.19
Alongside these developments, other countries increas-
ingly started imposing limits on the deductibility of
interest paid on intra-group loans in order to prevent
further erosion of their tax bases. This was followed by
the introduction of the CFC regulations. The OECD’s
1977 Transfer Pricing Guidelines provided only three
methods for determining a commercial or arm’s length
price for intra-group transactions: (1) the comparable
uncontrolled price (CUP); (2) the cost plus, and (3) the
resale minus. In the vast majority of cases, however,
these three traditional methods were inadequate as no
comparable transactions between non-affiliated parties
could be identified. In 1995, therefore, the OECD
responded to this lack of comparability, once again fol-
lowing an example set by the United States, by introdu-
cing two new methods: the transactional net margin
method (TNMM) and the transactional profit split. Of
these two calculation methods, the latter can be seen as a
move, to some extent, in the direction of the global
formulary apportionment method.20 Until the BEPS
package, however, neither of these methods offered suf-
ficient scope for ‘value-creating countries’ to effectively
tax residual profits. That is understandable, given that
both methods are still based on the principle of tax
recognition of the relevant group entities and the con-
tractual transactions they enter into with each other.21
The outcomes of the BEPS Action Points 8–10 have since
resulted in revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
being published on 10 July 2017. The OECD Member
States’ aim in revising these guidelines is that, as far as
the apportionment of profits is concerned, transfer pri-
cing outcomes should reflect the economic rather than
the legal reality. However, these proposals, too, continue
to be based on the existing connecting factors for corpo-
rate taxes (i.e. entities and transactions) and so
essentially do not represent a real solution to the pro-
blems countries face in seeking to tax the residual profits
of MNOs.
3 OECD/G20 AND EU STRATEGIES FOR
COMBATTING BEPS
3.1 Introduction
It is generally recognized by now that the ‘base erosion
and profit shifting’ strategies of MNOs create an unfair
playing field between enterprises: where two enterprises
have the same functions, assets and risks, an internation-
ally operating enterprise – the MNO – can achieve a lower
effective tax burden than an enterprise operating within a
single jurisdiction.22 This difference in the availability of
opportunities for enterprises operating exclusively locally
creates a perverse incentive for them to expand interna-
tionally, without any business economic reason for doing
so, in order to achieve higher returns. It was this unin-
tended adverse effect, combined with the loss of tax
revenues and the undermining of a fair and equitable
tax system, that was behind the efforts to devise policy
strategies for combatting BEPS. The various strategies
favoured by the OECD/G20 and the EU in their attempts
to combat BEPS are discussed below. We first discuss
those put forward by the OECD, in section 3.2, while
also briefly considering alternative ways to tax MNOs’
profits. In section 3.3 we describe how the EU has
responded to the outcomes of the OECD/G20 BEPS
Action Plan. Not only is the European Commission
encouraging efforts to address BEPS in the short term,
but it has also long envisaged a more structural solution
for combatting BEPS. This, too, we will discuss in brief.
3.2 OECD STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING BEPS
As discussed above in section 2.1, the OECD’s Action
Plan has chosen not to seek a more structural solution
for the problem of BEPS. While its ‘Addressing BEPS’
report admits that the generally accepted principles for
attributing tax jurisdiction may not have kept pace with
the changing business environment, the OECD does not
see this as a reason to move away from the current tax
framework. By maintaining this framework, the OECD
has opted for a strategy aimed at combatting the artificial
tax-planning arrangements known to be used by MNOs.
It is seeking to achieve this by (1) making it difficult, if
not impossible, for MNOs to exploit differences between
national tax systems23 and to avail themselves of
19 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the
OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation, (1) World Tax J. 3
(2010).
20 The OECD is not in favour of the global formulary apportionment
method, given that countries will be very divided on the exact
composition of the formula and it will be very difficult, if not
impossible, to reach consensus. See G. Cottani, Formulary
Apportionment: A Revamp in the Post-Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Era?, (10) Intertax 755–756 (2016). And while the United Nations’
Transfer Pricing manual admittedly does not reject the global for-
mulary apportionment method outright, Member States are warned
that applying it on a global scale could result in double taxation if
countries do not first reach agreement on a suitable uniform method
of apportionment. See United Nations, Practical Manual on Transfer
Pricing for Developing Countries paras 1.4.13 and 3.2.3 (2013).
21 This is also recognized by the OECD. See e.g. its response to
question 53, one of the frequently asked questions about BEPS:
‘How does transfer pricing lead to BEPS? The arm’s length principle
has proven useful as a practical and balanced standard for tax
administrations and taxpayers to evaluate transfer prices between
associated enterprises, and to prevent double taxation. However,
with its perceived emphasis on contractual allocations of functions,
assets and risks, the existing guidance on the application of the
principle has also proven vulnerable to manipulation.’
22 See e.g. OECD, supra n. 7, at 48; and OECD, supra n. 5, at 8.
23 By neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch structures, tighten-
ing the CFC rules, limiting the deductibility of interest to a specific
percentage of EBITDA, mandatory stipulating of the ‘nexus
approach’ for patent box regimes, and using revised TP guidelines
to combat cashboxes so that transfer pricing outcomes align with
the place where an MNO adds value.
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international tax schemes,24 but also by (2) encouraging
MNOs25 and also national tax authorities,26 via transpar-
ency requirements, to be more cautious about exploiting
tax rules or schemes. What these two categories of BEPS
measures have in common is that both aim to prevent
MNOs using legal, but artificial arrangements to locate
their functions, assets and risks in tax-friendly (or more
tax-friendly) jurisdictions. It follows from this that the
OECD supports the general principle of aligning the
application of tax rules with the legal form. It is willing
to abandon this principle only if the legal reality is totally
at odds with the economic reality. This immediately
highlights the weakness of the measures proposed for
combatting BEPS as these measures will have no effect
on tax planning by MNOs if, for example, the activities
performed by the latter do not result in a local ‘presence’
or if intra-group transactions are used as a means of
exploiting rate differences. The only situation in which
the BEPS measures will affect tax-planning structures is if
these structures are considered artificial. This was also
acknowledged by the Dutch tax authorities and the
Ministry of Finance in an internal memorandum in
which they outlined possible alternative scenarios for
the hybrid entity structures covered in ATAD 2.27 The
IMF staff reached the same conclusion in their report
entitled ‘Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation’
of 9 May 2014.28
This is why we believe that a structural solution to tax
planning by MNOs demands a different approach to
taxation. In our view, this should seek to reflect the
economic rather than the legal reality, given that the
latter can be manipulated, as shown in the various
BEPS reports and the IMF staff’s Spillovers report. In
the introduction set out in section 3.1, we referred to
the factors driving the BEPS Action Plan. The adverse
effects of BEPS could be more radically eliminated if the
consolidated worldwide profits of MNOs (the object)
were to be determined uniformly (‘unitary and consoli-
dated basis’) and then appropriately apportioned to the
various countries (‘global formulary apportionment’).
According to the IMF Spillovers report, taxation on this
basis would admittedly limit ‘conventional transfer
pricing problems, but would create new difficulties
around the factors used to apportion profits across jur-
isdictions, and would not necessarily shift tax base
towards developing countries’.29 Steps will need to be
taken, therefore, to prevent the choice of the compo-
nents to be used in the apportionment formula simply
creating new opportunities for MNOs and countries to
engage in arbitrage. Manipulation of these components
could be avoided by opting for ‘sales’ as the sole compo-
nent (and so excluding capital and labour – i.e. wages
and employees). Tax literature on the subject has pro-
posed switching towards a taxation on the basis of desti-
nation instead of origin.30 The IMF Spillovers report
shows moreover that opting for such an apportionment
formula would have less of an impact on countries in
terms of their corporate tax revenues than a formula that
comprised other components.31 However, it is important
in this respect to define what is meant by ‘sales’. After
various US states opted for an apportionment formula
based entirely on ‘sales’, other states followed their
example,32 given that an additional benefit of such an
apportionment formula is that it is corporate tax-neutral
as far as the locating of operating, R&D, strategic and
management support functions are concerned.
For a while it seemed as if the United States would
introduce a destination-based corporate tax,33 which
would have represented a complete trend break in the
international tax playing field. Ultimately, however, this
plan failed to be adopted, both because of national and
international lobbying, and has since been abandoned. It
remains very important, however, to consider what the
effect would be on EU Member States if the US or
another major trading block were to introduce such a
tax based on destination. The question of whether other
countries would then have to follow this example, either
autonomously or under an EU banner, also needs to be
considered.
3.3 EU STRATEGY IN RESPONSE TO BEPS PACKAGE
The EU responded to the BEPS package by adopting the
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) on 12 July
2016.34 In doing so, it sought to accommodate the
BEPS outcomes by introducing a restriction on interest
24 By preventing treaty shopping and artificial avoidance of permanent
establishment status.
25 Mandatorily requiring MNOs to: (1) disclose their aggressive tax-
planning structures to tax authorities; (2) provide information on
their transfer pricing policy for their worldwide activities, and (3)
prepare Country-by-Country reporting.
26 By compulsorily requiring the automatic exchanging with other
countries of information on six types of rulings, specifically (1)
rulings relating to preferential regimes; (2) cross-border unilateral
APAs; (3) informal capital rulings; (4) permanent establishment
rulings; (5) conduit rulings, and (6) other rulings designated by
the OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices.
27 Annex to the letter from the Ministry of Finance of 27 Mar. 2017,
ref. 2017/60179, CV/BV-structuren in Nederland, analyse n.a.v. het
voorstel tot wijziging van de Richtlijn anti-belastingontwijking (ATAD 2)
at 16 and 17.
28 IMF Staff Report of 9 May 2014, Spillovers on International
Corporate Taxation, at 35.
29 See supra.
30 See Arnaud de Graaf, Paul de Haan & Maarten de Wilde, supra n.
15, at 316 and the sources referenced there.
31 At 40, Table 4.
32 See M. F. de Wilde, Sharing the Pie. Taxing Multinationals in a Global
Market 417 (PhD thesis, Rotterdam 2015) and the sources refer-
enced there.
33 GOP Tax Reform Task Force, A Better Way: Our Vision for a
Confident America (24 June 2016), https://abetterway.speaker.
gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf [perma.cc/G6B3-
YMT3]. For a critical commentary, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah &
Kimberly A. Clausing, Problems with Destination-Based Corporate
Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint, Washington Center for Equitable
Growth (Feb. 2017).
34 Directive 2016/1164, OJEU 2016, L 193, at 1–14.
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deductibility in the form of an earnings-stripping provi-
sion (Article 4), by establishing CFC rules (Articles 7
and 8) and by neutralizing certain qualification differ-
ences (Article 9). In the EU’s view, introducing legisla-
tion for these relatively ‘voluntary’ BEPS outcomes on
the basis of ‘every man for himself’ rather than at an EU
level would not be effective and would also not help to
promote a level playing field within and outside the
EU. By adopting a second, amending, directive on 21
February 2017, the Council also extended the ATAD’s
territorial scope of application with regard to the neu-
tralizing of qualification differences so as to include
third countries, while also extending its material scope
of application by neutralizing other qualification
differences.35 This Directive not only contains provi-
sions implementing these three BEPS action points,
but also two other provisions, specifically an exit tax
(Article 5) and a general anti-abuse provision (Article
6). The ATAD has to be implemented by 31 December
2018 and applicable from 1 January 2019, while the
Amendment Directive has to be implemented by 31
December 2019 and applicable from 1 January 2020.
However, provisions relating to reverse hybrids do not
need to be implemented until 31 December 2021 and
applicable from 1 January 2022.
Not only did the EU respond to the BEPS package by
adopting the ATAD, but also by adopting two other
directives on transparency. Its Directive 2015/2376 of 8
December 2015 amended the Administrative
Cooperation Directive 2011/16 of 15 February 2011 to
take account of the BEPS commitments on the mutual
exchange of information on various types of rulings and
transfer pricing agreements (BEPS Action Point 5). This
Amendment Directive requires EU Member States auto-
matically to exchange information on all cross-border
rulings and transfer pricing agreements. On 25 May
2016, the Council then adopted Directive 2016/881,
which also amended the Administrative Cooperation
Directive. This new, second Amendment Directive deals
with the BEPS commitments on Country-by-Country
reporting (BEPS Action Point 13). Lastly, in June 2017,
the European Commission issued a third proposal for
amending the Administrative Cooperation Directive.36
Under this proposal, intermediaries will be required to
disclose certain tax structures, which do not necessarily
have to be harmful, to their local tax authorities before
these arrangements are implemented. The tax authorities
then have to enter this information in a database that can
be accessed by the tax authorities of all the EU Member
States.
Further progress was also recently achieved in
respect of the resolution of cross-border tax disputes
within the EU, with the Commission’s October 2016
proposal for a directive on tax dispute resolution
mechanisms in the EU being adopted by the Council
in early October 2017.37
Even before the BEPS package was published, the
European Commission announced in 2013 that it
would use the state aid instrument against multina-
tionals exploiting differences between national tax sys-
tems. By invoking this instrument, the EC was seeking
to create a more level playing field between multina-
tionals and the EU Member States. The EC conse-
quently decided in summer 2013 to set up a Task
Force Tax Planning Practices,38 primarily to investigate
EU Member States whose tax authorities were known to
have entered into unilateral advance pricing agreements
(APA) with MNOs. According to the EC, these unilat-
eral APAs often result in multinationals being able to
artificially allocate their profits to other countries with-
out any liability for any corresponding taxes in those
countries, with the result that they are able to achieve
double non-taxation. Even if that were to be the case,
the next question would be which country or countries
should then tax this residual profit. Does the EUR 13
billion of state aid that the EC has ordered Ireland to
claim back from Apple actually represent non-collected
tax on Irish profits? Apple’s two Irish companies admit-
tedly contractually purchased products from other
group companies and then contractually sold the final
products to consumers, but that does not mean that the
residual profit, comprising the margin between the
purchasing and selling prices, is automatically Irish
profit. Under the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and
given the activities of the two companies in Ireland,
Ireland would attribute a considerably lower share of
the profit to Ireland. It therefore considers the EC to be
fundamentally wrong in ordering it to impose tax retro-
spectively on US profits. The fact that these residual
profits of Apple are not liable to tax in either Ireland or
the US is the result of Apple’s conscious decision to
create a mismatch in the way in which its two Irish
subsidiaries are classified for tax purposes. In essence,
the EC should have called on the US to tax Apple’s as
yet untaxed residual profit.
By adopting the ATAD, as well as the two directives
amending the Administrative Cooperation Directive, the
Dispute Resolution Directive and the agreements
reached within the Code of Conduct Group on patent
box regimes, and also by invoking the state aid instru-
ment, the EU is seeking to prevent multinationals from
‘artificially’ exploiting differences in tax rates, taxable
objects and taxable subjects. Until recently, EU
Member States were only obliged: (1) to relinquish, in
whole or part, their entitlement to impose tax in order
to avoid international double taxation on intra-group
35 Amending Directive 2017/952, L 144, at 1–11.
36 Proposal for Amendment of Directive, 21 June 2017, COM(2017)
335 final.
37 Directive 2017/1852 of 10 Oct. 2017, OJ L 265, at 1.
38 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/tax_rulings/index_en.
html.
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payments of dividends, interest and royalties; (2) to
refrain from harmful tax practices when seeking to
attract mobile capital; (3) not to provide state aid
incompatible with the internal market, and (4) to
respect the EU treaty freedoms. The adopting of the
BEPS package and specifically the adopting of the
ATAD further restrict EU Member States’ freedom
with regard to their corporate tax policies.
These increasing restrictions on EU Member States’
policy freedom, as well as Member States’ growing
awareness that none of these measures will wholly put
an end to tax planning by multinationals, may ultimately
pave the way for a consolidated European tax base.
Indeed, the EC made a fresh proposal on 25 October
2016 to ‘Europeanise’ Member States’ corporate tax
bases. In contrast to its Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal of 2011, the
EC’s 2016 proposal suggests that a European CCTB
should be mandatory for all multinational groups oper-
ating in the EU and having consolidated revenues
exceeding EUR 750 million, while also making provision
in a later, second phase for full tax consolidation of the
revenues of multinational groups within the EU. If a
CCTB ever materializes, the EC wants to ensure that
consolidation will also be possible. The EC has also
announced a separate proposal for a directive39 for the
second phase, including a formula for apportioning mul-
tinationals’ taxable base between Member States.
However, two thirds of this formula still comprises the
traditional production factors (capital and labour), while
only one third relates to sales. Continuing to allocate
taxation rights on the basis of the traditional production
factors, as described in section 3.2, will not put an end to
tax arbitrage.
Under these 2016 proposals for directives, the
Member States remain free to determine the rate at
which they tax the taxable base apportioned to them.
The EC has not previously been in favour of a uniform
rate or, indeed, even a minimum rate. It is now changing
its views, however, partly in response to pressure from
Germany, France, Italy and Spain,40 so as to reverse a
further race to the bottom on rates, including under a
CCCTB. As yet, however, it has not dared to speak out
publicly in favour of a minimum corporate tax rate
because of not wanting to upset opponents of this,
such as Ireland.
In addition to the work being carried out within
the EU, the OESO/G20 has also set up an Ad hoc
Group, comprising delegates from nearly a hundred
countries, and which formulated the MLI provisions,
recitals and explanatory notes (Action Point 15)41
published on 24 November 2016. The MLI published
contains material provisions on hybrid mismatches,42
treaty abuse,43 the use of artificial structures to avoid
permanent establishment status,44 improvements in
the mutual agreement procedures,45 improvements
in corresponding transfer price adjustments46 and
binding arbitrage.47 The only situations where provi-
sion is made for a minimum standard are for combat-
ting treaty shopping and improving the mutual
agreement procedures, for which the MLI offers
countries a wide range of implementation methods.48
While these other provisions are of a less binding
nature, the keenness to persuade countries
nevertheless to implement them explains why the
MLI provides a multitude of possible ways for coun-
tries to do so in a customized fashion. The MLI and
the proposals for directives published by the
Commission and adopted within the EU will overlap
to some extent, either partially or fully, while the way
in which the various instruments will relate to each
other in EU law also remains to be seen.
3.4 ABRIDGED OVERVIEW OF THE BEPS FOLLOW-UP
BY THE OECD/G20 AND EU
A brief overview is provided below of the commitments
and follow-up agreed on by the OECD/G20 and EU in
respect of the fifteen BEPS action points. In the final
column, we also indicate the response required from
the individual countries.
39 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) of 25 Oct. 2016, COM(2016) 683.
At first sight this proposal could seem to represent a solution for
the above problem. However, it targets only larger enterprises.
Furthermore, it makes no provision for a minimum rate, with the
result that the apportionment formula would still allow rate arbit-
rage to occur. Owing to these two aspects, the European
Commission’s CCCTB proposal does not even enjoy the support
of larger Member States such as Germany and France.
40 During a special hearing of the European Parliament on 22 Sept.
2015 the finance ministers of Germany, France, Italy and Spain
said that a minimum tax rate would help combat aggressive tax
planning by MNOs. See http://www.politico.eu/article/finance-min
isters-luxleaks-call-for-minimum-eu-tax-rate/.
41 As of 2 Mar. 2017 the Ad hoc Group had 106 members.
42 Part II, Arts 3–5.
43 Part III, Arts 6–11.
44 Part IV, Arts 12–15.
45 Part V, Art. 16.
46 Part V, Art. 17.
47 Part VI, Arts 18–26.
48 (1) Enforcement of existing treaty provision, providing this is in
line with the minimum standard; (2) the MLI has effect, with the
text offering various alternatives for implementation; or (3) the
treaty is kept fully outside the MLI’s scope of application.
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BEPS Action Items OESO/G20 Follow-Up EU Follow-Up Countries’ Reaction to BEPS
1 Digital economy
Framework to develop and monitor con-
trol mechanisms49
– –
2 Hybrid mismatches
MLI to implement treaty aspects + 2017
update of OECD Model
Amendment of Parent/Subsidiary
Directive
Unilateral national implementa-
tion and amendment of treaties
Framework to monitor implementation/
joint approach
Art. 9-9b ATAD50
3 CFC rules
Framework to monitor implementation of
best practices
Arts. 7 and 8 ATAD
Unilateral national implementation
(obligatory for EU Member States)
4 Interest deductions
Framework to monitor implementation/
joint approach
Art. 4 ATAD
Unilateral national implementa-
tion (obligatory for EU Member
States)
5 Harmful tax practices
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices to
monitor implementation via peer review.
Modified nexus approach to patent box
regimes
EU Code of Conduct51
Unilateral national implementa-
tion (obligatory for BEPS-com-
mitted countries)
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices to
monitor minimum standard for exchange
of rulings via peer review
Amendment of Administrative
Cooperation Directive52
6 Treaty abuse
MLI to implement minimum standard +
2017 update of OECD Model
Framework to monitor implementation of
minimum standard via peer review
Recommendation by EC53 to insert
a PPT into treaties
Amendment of treaties (treaty
shopping: obligatory for BEPS-
committed countries)
7
Permanent
establishment
MLI to implement + 2017 update of
OECD Model
Recommendation by EC to imple-
ment the new provisions of Art. 5
OECD Model in their treaties
Amendment of treaties
8-10 Transfer pricing
Framework to develop standards and
implementation guidance for tax adminis-
trations and taxpayers
Joint Transfer Pricing Forum
working on EU approach to
reviewing and updating of transfer
pricing
Unilateral national
implementation
11 BEPS data analysis
Framework to develop + monitor control
mechanisms
– –
12
Disclosure of aggressive
tax planning
Framework to monitor implementation of
best practices
Proposal to amend Administrative
Cooperation Directive54
Unilateral national
implementation
13
Transfer pricing
documentation
Multilateral Competent Authority
Agreement on exchanging of CbC reporting
to enable automatic exchange under
Multilateral Competent Authority
agreement55 Framework to monitor mini-
mum standard of Country-by-Country
reporting via peer review
Amendment of Administrative
Cooperation Directive56
Unilateral national implementa-
tion (obligatory for BEPS-com-
mitted countries)
14 Dispute resolution
MLI to implement minimum standard +
2017 update of OECD Model
Framework to monitor minimum standard
via peer review
Dispute Resolution Directive57
Amendment of treaties (MAP:
obligatory for all BEPS-committed
countries) & unilateral national
implementation of EU Directive
15 Multilateral instrument Signing of MLI by seventy-one countries58 – –
49 See the OECD Background Brief – Inclusive Framework on BEPS, Jan. 2017.
50 Directive 2016/1164, OJEU 2016, L 193, at 1–14.
51 See EU Council document 15148/15 and EU Council document 6900/16.
52 Directive 2015/2376 of 8 Dec. 2015 amending the Administrative Cooperation Directive 2011/16 of 15 Feb. 2011 as regards mandatory
automatic exchange of certain types of rulings and transfer price agreements.
53 EC Recommendation of 28 Jan. 2016, C(2016) 271.
54 Proposal to Amend Directive of 21 June 2017, COM(2017) 335 final.
55 Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement for the Automatic Exchange of Country-by-Country reports.
56 Directive 2016/881 amending the Administrative Cooperation Directive as regards the BEPS commitments on Country-by-Country reporting
(BEPS Action Point 13).
57 Directive 2017/1852 of 10 Oct. 2017, OJ L 265, at 1.
58 As at 25 Oct. 2017.
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4 CHOICE OF INSTRUMENTS FOR COMBATTING
BEPS
4.1 Introduction
In order to achieve timely, consistent and widespread
implementation of the four minimum standards, the
OECD decided in January 2016 to establish the
Inclusive Framework on BEPS, or the BEPS
Implementation Forum, (‘the Framework’). A system
of monitoring and peer review, with which the OECD
and G20 have had good experience in the Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information
for Tax Purposes, will be used to encourage
Framework members to implement and also apply
the minimum standards. At the same time, the
Framework is going to monitor the implementation
of the rest of the BEPS package, including the two
common approaches and the two best practice guide-
lines mentioned in the introduction. In addition, the
Framework will work on finalizing the remaining parts
of the BEPS package. Lastly, the Framework has been
tasked with devising control mechanisms to gain more
insight into developments in the digital economy
(Action Item 1) and the economic impact of the
BEPS package (Action Item 11). The data gathered in
this respect will provide a basis for further action by
the OECD and G20.
Whereas, however, the OECD and G20 are seeking
via peer review (following the example of the
Transparency Forum) to persuade countries to incorpo-
rate the BEPS commitments into their national legislation
and to implement and apply procedures and treaties, the
EU Member States have chosen to pursue a different
route by opting to transpose the less ‘binding’ BEPS
measures and other counter-measures into national leg-
islation via the ATAD. In the following subsections, we
discuss firstly the instrument chosen by the EU and then
that chosen by the OECD.
4.2 EU: Directive
In a contribution published last year in EC Tax Review
we examined the EU’s decision to use a directive as its
instrument of choice for combatting BEPS by MNOs. We
concluded that contribution by expressing doubts as to
whether opting for a directive would prove effective,
given its nature and how the process would work in
practice, in meeting EU’s wish for legal certainty and a
level playing field. In our view, these objectives could be
satisfactorily achieved if the EU Member States were to
base their monitoring of the implementation and appli-
cation on the example set by the Transparency Forum.
Consistent implementation and application of the anti-
avoidance measures would seem then to be more
assured, despite the ‘soft law’ nature of these measures
and the model used for monitoring how they are imple-
mented and applied.
4.3 OECD: Soft Law and Peer Review
The OECD established its Inclusive Framework on BEPS
in January 2016. By November 2017, a total of 104
countries59 had joined on an equal footing, with six
organizations60 admitted as international observers. The
structure of this Framework is based on that of the
Transparency Forum, which by November 2017 had a
total of 146 members/countries and 15 international
organizations admitted as observers. The Transparency
Forum uses a peer review to monitor the extent to which
the standards agreed for the exchange of information
between countries are being implemented and complied
with. Although the Transparency Forum is structured
differently from the other OECD global forums, it has
been seen to be working effectively, and its structure was
consequently chosen as the basis for the Framework.
The OECD and G20 had two objectives in setting up
the Framework. Firstly, they wanted to ensure that the
four minimum standards agreed – harmful tax practices
(BEPS 5), tax treaty abuse (BEPS 6), Country-by-Country
reporting (BEPS 13) and dispute resolution mechanisms
(BEPS 14) – would be implemented and applied by the
countries committed to BEPS. The mechanism that has
been chosen for this purpose is a peer review process.
The second objective is to further develop the action
points that have not yet resulted in agreement on mini-
mum standards and joint approaches, with the main
emphasis in this respect being on the deductibility of
interest payments and transfer pricing. The OECD has
not yet published any policy papers on this second
objective.
As far as performing the peer review process is con-
cerned, the OECD has by now published three of the
four peer review documents, while the document on tax
treaty abuse will follow in 2018. These documents dis-
cuss how to check whether countries have implemented
the minimum standards for exchanging information and
for improving and accelerating the procedures for resol-
ving disputes on the application of tax treaties in
national law. The reviews consequently focus on the
operating processes within and between tax authorities,
as well as on the operating and other processes in the
interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities in the
event of disputes concerning the application of tax trea-
ties in MAP procedures. In other words, the main focus
of the peer review is on provisions in national formal law
and on these provisions’ interaction with tax treaties.
The main outline of the peer review process is as
described above, with the procedures varying from one
59 http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-compo
sition.pdf.
60 The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), the Centre de
rencontres et d’études des dirigeants des administrations fiscales
(CREDAF), the Centro Interamericano de Administraciones
Tributarias (CIAT), together with other international organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank
(WB) and the United Nations (UN).
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action point to another in terms of duration and level of
detail. Local implementation of the standards is to be
verified on the basis of a pre-determined criteria, which
are detailed in the peer review documents as ‘terms of
reference’, and specify all the elements to be complied
within the local regulations and procedures. The verifi-
cation methods to be used are then detailed, with the
primary method being standardized lists. A country first
has to indicate on the standardized lists whether its local
legislation and procedures are consistent with the terms
of reference. Once a country has submitted its input for
the peer review process, its compliance with the stan-
dards is assessed. This is followed by recommendations
being sent to the relevant country. The latter has the
opportunity to respond, and this may result in the
recommendations being revised. The final recommenda-
tions will then be adopted country by country and
grouped together for all the countries.
In the case of the said BEPS action points, the peer
review and monitoring are very formalized processes. As
they do not directly affect a country’s taxable base, they
are not likely to attract any wide-ranging opposition (see
below, however). We expect the reactions to differ, how-
ever, once it comes to assessing local rules on interest
deductibility and transfer pricing rules: when third
countries assess whether a country has implemented
the agreed standards, an adverse assessment could affect
the tax base and, therefore, the opportunities to conduct
policy designed to attract investments. The peer review
that the Netherlands once unilaterally conducted of tax
legislation and regulations in other EU Member States
shows that if material regulations are subjected to
review, it is very important to set clear, relatively objec-
tive standards on which to base a constructive dialogue
between countries.
This latter example raises the question of whether the
OECD’s peer review process provides sufficient protec-
tion against political intervention, and whether all coun-
tries will in fact implement and apply the minimum
standards. On the one hand, the group of countries
participating in the review61 is broad-ranging – both in
terms of size and development levels, without any formal
hierarchical structure – and so should be able to ensure
that countries can speak freely. On the other hand,
however, it is not clear how the governments in coun-
tries that fail to implement certain minimum standards
should be called to account.
There is an inherent tension in the peer review pro-
cess in that while a government can undertake to trans-
pose certain standards into domestic legislation, the
adopting of these standards will have to be in accordance
with the requirements of domestic legislation and regu-
lations and democratic representation. A government can
succeed or fail in that respect, depending on its inten-
tions, on the prevailing circumstances and on the
dynamics of the local political climate. The most likely
scenario is that the vast majority of countries will imple-
ment the agreed minimum standards. However, the
OECD documents make no provision for procedures to
deal with the situation where a commitment has been
given, but has later been withdrawn, or where the
accompanying legislation and regulations have not been
implemented in time or correctly.
A recent example of this can be seen in the OECD
file62 on the automatic exchange of information on sav-
ings, where the United States’ own legislation and reg-
ulations prevent this country from meeting the
minimum standards set by the Transparency Forum.63
The problem here is that under basic American law, not
all US companies are required to apply for a federal
EIN,64 and this makes it impossible in certain cases to
gather and subsequently exchange information on the
parties associated with the company.65,66 Although the
Speaker of the House of Representatives was requested
during the Obama administration to introduce legal pro-
visions to deal with this issue, while at the same time
proposals for an administrative rule to remedy this loop-
hole were made, the problem continues to exist at a
federal (i.e. central) government level, with the result
that the United States appears not to be complying
with the minimum standards agreed within the
Transparency Forum.67,68
61 See e.g. the Framework steering group: http://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps/steering-group-of-the-inclusive-framework-on-beps.pdf.
62 The United States does not participate directly in the Common
Reporting Standard. See fn. 1 in the AEOI Commitments of 23 Feb.
2017: ‘The United States has indicated that it is undertaking automatic
information exchanges pursuant to FATCA from 2015 and has entered
into intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with other jurisdictions to do
so. The Model 1A IGAs entered into by the United States acknowledge
the need for the United States to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal
automatic information exchange with partner jurisdictions. They also
include a political commitment to pursue the adoption of regulations and
to advocate and support relevant legislation to achieve such equivalent
levels of reciprocal automatic exchange.’ (https://www.oecd.org/tax/
transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf).
63 To which the Greens in the European Parliament drew attention:
see Greens-EFA.EU and https://www.greensefa.eu/legacy/fileadmin/
dam/Documents/Studies/Taxation/The_US_as_a_tax_haven_
Implications_for_Europe_11_May_FINAL.pdf.
64 Employer Identification Number, a registration equivalent to the
Dutch tax identification number. This is applied for on the SS-4
form.
65 Under the currently applicable regulations, no EIN has to be
applied for if a corporation does not have a bank account at a US
financial institution and has no or virtually no US activities; to put
it briefly, if it has no employees, no qualifying pension plan, no
obligation to prepare returns for payroll taxes, withholding taxes,
profit taxes and duties, and no involvement in certain types of
organizations, legal persons and assets. See https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/do-you-need-an-ein.
66 In addition, only the ‘responsible party’ in a US corporation, rather
than the ultimate beneficiary, has to be stated; see https://www.irs.
gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/responsible-parties-
and-nominees.
67 See the letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Lew, of 6 May
2016.
68 The situation in the US illustrates a possible bottleneck underlying
all the BEPS standards: does a country that has committed itself to
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Similar problems could also arise when it comes to
implementing the minimum standards agreed in
respect of BEPS Action Points 5, 6, 13 and 14.69
This potential shortcoming requires action from the
other countries that have committed themselves to
implementing the BEPS outcomes. Whether intention-
ally or otherwise, the United States created an inter-
esting precedent and possible solution for this
problem when it unilaterally enacted the FATCA leg-
islation, which is intended to ensure the exchange of
information relevant for federal taxation purposes.70 If
certain countries’ governments prove unable to comply
with what has been agreed, this legislation allows
other countries, groups of countries or international
organizations with regulatory powers to initiate legis-
lation or regulations that would in effect force the
non-compliant countries to implement the minimum
standards because the economic and other conse-
quences of not doing so would be so severe.71 Such
an initiative is currently being worked on within the
European Code of Conduct Group (Business
Taxation), specifically including criteria for assessing
the harmful nature of arrangements from a transpar-
ency and transfer pricing perspective. If a country does
not meet the criteria, the plan is that it should be
placed on a blacklist. A country on the blacklist will
then face tax sanctions by the EU Member States.
What these sanctions will entail is currently being
discussed by the members of the Code of Conduct
Group.
5 CLOSING COMMENTS AND SUMMARY
We conclude that it proves very difficult to effectively
combat tax planning by MNOs within the current, fun-
damentally outdated tax framework. As we see it, the
only effective way to address this problem is by conduct-
ing thorough, in-depth research into structural solutions
for BEPS within the OESO, G20 and/or EU.
Furthermore, minimum standards have been set for
only some of the outcomes of the BEPS action points,
one of which relates to improvements in dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms and so not combatting of BEPS. Viewed
from that perspective, the results of the OESO/G20 BEPS
Action Plan can so far be regarded as disappointing. On
the other hand, the EU seems albeit slow making pro-
gress within the scope of its opportunities to implement
the BEPS recommendations and taking measures that
will genuinely have an impact. We expect that this
process can be further accelerated by making provision
for a peer review within the EU, based on the example
set by the OECD and that has proven to be an effective
way of monitoring the implementation and application
of mutual agreements. Within the EU, a peer review
structure comparable to the OECD’s Framework would
produce a structured and public inventory of the varying
levels of BEPS progress achieved by the individual
Member States, large or small. Making these results
public will, for example, result in far more information
becoming available, with the result that all sorts of par-
ties, including outsiders, will be able to express their
opinions and thus exercise informal pressure within the
EU. Within the OECD, by contrast, countries could fail
to get the minimum standards transposed into their local
legislation and regulations. In that case, informal pres-
sure could also obviously be exercised; however, the
dynamics within the OECD are different from those in
the EU. What it really comes down to is that this will
require an initiative from countries, or groups of coun-
tries, with sufficient weight to exert the pressure needed
to persuade those countries that are lagging behind to
abandon their resistance and proceed to implement the
standards.
these standards also have the statutory and administrative powers
needed to convert this commitment into enforceable law? The US is
a good example of how complicated this can be: the US govern-
ment has no right to initiate legislative proposals; only the House of
Representatives and the Senate have this right. And even if a law
includes powers to issue administrative rules, all the stages of the
Administrative Procedure Act have to be completed before the
regulations become final. It can therefore take years for such
regulations to be finalized. Lastly, the same regulations can also
be withdrawn by a future administration, providing certain condi-
tions and procedures are complied with. The replacement of the
Obama administration by the Trump administration has clearly
highlighted these aspects, and the question of whether the Trump
administration will actually implement commitments given by the
Obama administration also remains open.
69 Does US national legislation and regulations allow the requested
information on MNOs to be supplied? Although it would admit-
tedly seem less likely that MNOs will have US companies that are
not required to apply for an EIN, it nevertheless remains possible
that an MNO may, e.g. have a US LLC without an EIN. And even if
an American corporation has an EIN, the information that has to be
passed to the IRS will be determined by federal legislation and
legislation at a state level.
70 The consequences of non-compliance were so draconian that other
countries proved willing to eliminate obstacles in their national
regulations that prevented this exchange of information. By now,
110 countries are collecting information for the US tax authorities
and 200,000 financial institutions have registered with the IRS. See
e.g. the letter from the Secretary of the Treasury Lew of 6 May
2016.
71 An example of this is the proposal by parties such as the European
Parliament to add the United States to an EU blacklist of tax havens
(to be compiled).
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